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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutional Setup of the Executive Branch
The interpretive commentary to our current, 1876 Texas Constitution
states our constitutional framers deliberately intended to weaken the
executive branch of government.1 Hence, it is commonly held that Texas
is a weak governor state.
This was effected by providing for not only a governor in the executive
branch, but “a Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Comptroller of
Public Accounts, Commissioner of the General Land Office, and Attorney
General.”2 All of these positions, except the secretary of state, are directly
elected by the people3 rather than appointed to serve at the pleasure of the
governor. This arrangement diffuses the authority within the executive
department itself so that such officers are largely independent of the
governor—thus establishing a “plural executive.”4 This independence from
governor influence is guaranteed for the officers solely dependent upon the
electorate for maintaining their offices.5
However, the framers labeled the governor the chief executive officer6
and provided: “He shall cause the laws to be faithfully executed . . . .”7 Yet,
the interpretive commentary points out this general grant of power is in
essence an empty vessel for its lack of specificity.8 In other words, this
1. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 interp. commentary; see also Ronald L. Beal, Power of the Governor:
Did the Court Unconstitutionally Tell the Governor to Shut Up?, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 72, 76–81 (2010).
2. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. Id. § 2.
4. Id. § 1 interp. commentary (stating a plural executive “makes for a separation of powers
within the executive department itself).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 1.
7. Id. § 10.
8. Cf. id. § 10 interp. commentary (stating this obligation does “not confer upon [the governor]
any specific power. . . .” and that it is, in fact, “more fiction than reality”).
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general grant of power “is more fiction than reality” and merely allows the
governor “to give direction to the arrangement of affairs in all the branches
of the executive department.”9
In addition, the governor may appoint all statutory state officers, but
those appointments are only valid “subject to the approval of two-thirds of
the senate.”10 The officers have a two-year term11 unless they serve on a
board, in which case they serve six-year, staggered terms.12 The interpretive
commentary suggests, while one person may be better equipped to analyze
the qualities of a person to serve in state government, requiring senate
approval prevents patronage and recognizes the importance of these
officers to state government.13 The commentary also suggests the ultimate
approval of these persons to serve is “too important to the public welfare
to vest exclusively in one man”—namely, the governor.14
During their terms of service, state officers have a significant degree of
independence from the control of the governor.15 The Texas Constitution
mandates the legislature shall provide by law for trial and removal from
office of all state officers created by statute—they cannot be removed
directly by the governor.16 At one time, the legislature did so provide, but
for unknown reasons repealed the law, now providing for the trial of a state
officer.17 Currently, the only recourse by which a governor may remove a
state officer is seeking the agreement of the senate by a two-thirds vote.18
Therefore, the interpretive commentary states the governor’s power of
removal cannot be considered an effective instrument of administrative
control.19 Hence, the common phrase used by all is that they are
“independent officers.”
9. Id.
10. Id. § 12(a)–(b), interp. commentary.
11. Id. art. XVI, § (30)(a), interp. commentary.
12. Id.
13. Id. art. IV, § 12 interp. commentary.
14. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 17–19.
16. Id.
17. Compare id. (quoting the now-repealed statute: “All state officers appointed by the governor,
or elected by the legislature, where the mode of removal is not otherwise provided by law, may be
removed by him for good and sufficient cause, to be spread on the records of his office, and to be
reported by him to the next session of the legislature thereafter.”), with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5967, repealed by Act of May 31, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 461(1), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 986
(demonstrating the statute was repealed).
18. TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 9(a).
19. Id. § 7 interp. commentary.
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Yet, some power remains in the governor while state officers serve their
terms.20 The power of appointment along with set terms provides some
continuing control of these officers, for the power to reappoint someone
upon the conclusion of their term vests exclusively within the governor.21
Officers with two-year terms know the governor will be there to consider
their reappointment since the governor serves a four-year term.22 As for
officers serving on boards in six-year, staggered terms, at least one officer,
if not two, will have to ponder whether this governor is capable of reelection. However, generally, the overwhelming majority of officers know
they will have to answer for refusing a governor’s request if they desire
reappointment.23
B. They Shall “Cause the Laws to Be Faithfully Executed”
Beyond the governor’s express power to be commander-in-chief of the
military forces;24 to convene the legislature for extraordinary meetings;25
and to speak to the legislature at the commencement of each session;26 they
simply have the express power to “cause the laws to be faithfully
executed.”27 So, what does that mean? What power, if any, does that grant
to the governor?
The interpretive comment says it is more fiction than reality.28 At best,
it means the governor only has such executive power that is specifically
granted by the legislature, express or implied.29 It goes without citation that
the legislature grants civil, regulatory power in our various elected officials—
particularly the attorney general, who is wholly independent of the
governor—as well as regulatory agencies created to enforce specific
regulatory schemes. Even though governor-appointed (and sometimes
reappointed) state officers manage the regulatory agencies, the attorney
general represents the state’s interest “upon the filing of a suit to challenge
the validity of an agency rule or contested case order.” That interest goes
to the degree of the attorney general’s duty and power to exercise judgment
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra text accompanying notes 21–22.
See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 12(a)–(b) (vesting appointment power in the governor’s office).
Id. § 4.
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
Id. § 8.
Id. § 9.
Id. § 10.
See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
Id.
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and discretion, which cannot be controlled by agency authorities even if the
officers act at the direction of the governor.30 Even outside of specific
litigation, the constitution provides it is the attorney general, not the
governor, who may issue opinions as to the meaning of state law.31
So, can the governor do anything with their duty and power to “cause the
laws to be faithfully executed”? Amazingly, we have literally no reported
caselaw issued by the judiciary interpreting the power of the governor to
faithfully execute the law. However, we have a few hints.
On October 27, 2005, Governor Rick Perry issued Executive Order
RP 49 mandating the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ) “prioritize and expedite the processing of environmental permit
applications” to generate electrical power.32 He also ordered the State
Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) to conduct hearings on those
permits “no later than one week after the [expiration of the] required 30 day
public notice” period.33 A lawsuit commenced seeking injunctive relief
against the TCEQ and SOAH on the basis that Governor Perry’s Executive
Order was unconstitutional because he had no power to order an agency
regarding the exercise of their statutory powers.34 Judge Stephen Yelenosky
of the 345th District Court of Travis County issued a letter opinion that
granted a temporary injunction against the TCEQ and SOAH because the
plaintiffs would likely prevail on their constitutional argument.35 This
litigated issue ended shortly after the issuance of this order, but it suggested
at least one highly skilled judge with extensive administrative law experience
believed the constitution barred the Governor’s actions.
The second hint involves former Governor Perry again. On February 2,
2007, Governor Perry issued another Executive Order to the Texas
Department of State Health and Human Services (HHS) to adopt rules
mandating the pre-appropriate vaccination of all female children for human
papillomavirus (HPV).36 This controversy did not result in litigation, but
30. RONALD L. BEAL, TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.2.1, at 67
(23rd ed. 2020).
31. Id.
32. The Governor of the State of Tex., Exec. Ord. No. RP 49, 30 Tex. Reg 7797, 7797–98
(2005).
33. Id.
34. See Original Petition at 22–24, Citizens Org. for Res. & Env’t v. Perry, No. D-1-GN-07000129 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex., filed Jan. 18, 2007).
35. Letter Op. by Judge Stephen Yelenosky, Citizens Org. for Res. & Env’t v. Perry, No. D-1GN-07-000129 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis Cnty., Tex., issued Feb. 20, 2007).
36. The Governor of the State of Tex., Gov. Exec. Ord. No. RP 65, 32 Tex. Reg. 599 (2007).
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former Judge F. Scott McCown, a highly respected retired Travis County
judge, published an op-ed commentary declaring Governor Perry’s order
unconstitutional.37 The judge stated:
Asking instead of telling is not merely a matter of form. When the Governor
asks a state agency to consider a rule, he allows the rulemaking process to
work. When the Governor orders a state agency to adopt a rule, he shortcircuits the process.
. . . [I]t will only be a charade.38

Thus, we have two judges who seem to believe that a governor “faithfully
executing the law” cannot order a state officer how to exercise their
statutory power.39
What if the governor asks or requests a certain act to be done, but not
with the dressing of “executive order” at the top? We have no hints from
the judiciary on this issue under the 1876 Constitution, but we do have a
judicial opinion based on the 1845 Constitution.40 In 1859, the Texas
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the judiciary
should order a state officer to comply with a governor’s request to which
they had refused.41 The court held:
It is evidently contemplated, that [the governor] shall give direction to the
management of affairs, in all the branches of the executive department.
Otherwise he has very little to do. Where he has the power of removal, he
can assume authoritative control absolutely, in all of the departments. This
being the case in the United States government[] results in the entire unity of
its executive department. The absence of that absolute power of the chief
executive in this [S]tate[] must occasionally produce a want of harmony in the
executive administration, by the inferior officers of that department, declining
to comply with the wishes, or to follow the judgment of the governor. That
is an inherent difficulty in the organization of that department, and the
conflicts arising out of it, cannot be adjudicated or settled by the judiciary.
The fact that there is no remedy for an injury growing out of such conflict,
cannot justify another department, to wit, the judiciary, in overstepping the
37. F. Scott McCown, Opinion, Governor’s HPV Order Is Unconstitutional, CTR. FOR PUB. POL’YS,
Feb. 7, 2007, at 1–2.
38. Id. at 2.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 32–49.
40. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. V, § 1; see infra text accompanying notes 41–49.
41. Houston Tap & Brazoria Ry. Co. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317, 318 (Tex. 1859).
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boundary of its prescribed authority, for the purpose of furnishing a remedy.
The other department, the legislative, may be able to furnish a remedy. The
judiciary act on past facts. The legislature acts by devising for the future. It
is the peculiar province of the legislative department, to shape future events,
so as to obviate and remedy, the jars and difficulties of the past.42

Despite the statements of the interpretive commentary,43 the court held
the power to “take care the laws be faithfully executed” was in fact a grant
gubernatorial power to give direction to the management of affairs of the
executive branch.44 Does it matter if it is in the form of a request or an
order? The court was silent in that regard.45
Yet, as the court noted, if the state officer did not serve at the pleasure of
the governor, it would “occasionally produce a want of harmony” when
inferior officers declined to comply with the governor’s wishes and refrained
to follow their judgment.46 The court’s implications here are twofold. First,
by stating an officer’s refusal of such orders would occasionally—not
always—result in disharmony, the court implied that oftentimes the officers
would comply.47 Second, the court tacitly admitted the officers have the
legal right to comply with gubernatorial wishes.48 But, the key to this
analysis is the court clearly stated governors have the power to request or
order these “independent officers” with set terms to carry out the laws
according to their bidding—because, if not, the officers would never have
to decline the requests.49
Therefore, the power of the governor to direct the affairs of the executive
branch is not a fiction;50 it is a real constitutional power that will
undoubtedly place significant pressure upon appointed officers to heed the
concerns of the chief executive officer elected by the people to direct the
course of state government.51 Obviously, the decision to comply is
highlighted by the fact these officials were hand-picked by the governor to
42. Id. at 343–44.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
44. Randolph, 24 Tex. at 344.
45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 343.
47. Id.
48. See generally id. (implicating the same by not discussing any legality issues).
49. See id. at 343 (“The governor has manifested his wish, that this act should be performed, . . .
by the inferior officers” who may “declin[e] to comply with the wish[], or to follow the judgment of
the governor.”).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 6–9.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 40–49.
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do their will and depend on the governor to maintain their offices after their
terms expire.52 This should not be seen necessarily as a threat, but as an
integral part of the constitutional setup, which empowers the governor to
direct the officers of the executive branch while the check-and-balance
system allows an officer to refuse acting upon belief that there is no legal
basis to so act or that it would be inconsistent with statutory authority.
Therefore, these modern hints of what the power of the governor is
under the 1876 Texas Constitution appear to be fundamentally wrong:
Judge Yelenosky’s and Judge McCown’s assertions that the governor is
powerless to request or order state officers to take action have no basis in
law or fact at the present time.53
II. RULEMAKING: GOVERNOR ABBOTT’S “REQUEST”
TO BE A MAJOR PLAYER IN DECIDING WHAT RULES TO ADOPT
A. Constitutional Power of the Governor to Participate in the Rulemaking Process
The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the legislature’s ability
and right to delegate rulemaking power to regulatory agencies.54 The court
has held that a legislative body would be hard put to contend with every
detail involved in carrying out its laws in a complex society.55 It is absolutely
impossible to do. However:
The Texas Legislature may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry
out legislative purposes as long as it establishes reasonable standards to guide
the entity to which the powers are delegated. The separation of powers clause
merely requires that the standards of the delegation be reasonably clear and
hence acceptable as standard of measurement.56

52. See supra text accompanying notes 20–23.
53. Randolph, 24 Tex. at 344; see also Beal, supra note 1, at 81–88 (“Coupled with the label of
‘Chief Executive Officer’ that denotes him or her as the leader of the executive branch, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that the Governor has the constitutional power and duty to tell the
subordinate state officers how he or she believes the law should be interpreted and applied . . . .”)
(footnote omitted).
54. RONALD L. BEAL, 1 TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.1,
at 175–76 (Lexis 22d ed. 2020).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2–3.
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Then, the legislature can give the agency the power to make such rules to
fill in or carry out the details of the legislation.57
Since the governor is to “cause the laws to be faithfully executed,” does
that include rulemaking?58 The legal definition of executed is “[t]hat
[which] has been done, given, or performed.”59 As set forth above, the
legislature delegates pursuant to a statute to provide the agency with the
discretionary duty to fill in the details of the statute pursuant to legislative
standards.60 This means there is no separation of powers problem, as the
legislature is not delegating the inherent, exclusive power of general
legislation.61 The policy is adopted by the legislature and it establishes the
primary standards that the agency must adhere to.62 Therefore, the agency
and the governor may exercise this delegated power to “complete the duty”
of filling in the details of the statute in order to fulfill the legislative intent.63
This appears to be the exact interpretation of Governor Greg Abbott’s
office; on June 22, 2018, the regulatory agencies were informed they must
submit all proposed rules to his office so he and his staff may render “a
dispassionate ‘second opinion’ on the costs and benefits of the proposed
agency actions.”64 Governor Abbott is the first to assert such control over
the agency rulemaking process in the history of Texas. He did so not in the
form of an executive order, but merely a letter. Whether it was intentional
or coincidental, the letter was not written by Governor Abbott himself, but
by his Chief of Staff, Louis Saenz. Finally, the letter did not order or request
it to be done, but simply stated it was a clarification of the rulemaking
process by reviewing all proposed rules before the agencies commenced the
notice and comment rulemaking process.65
Was this approach taken to avoid Judge Yelenosky’s implied holding that
a governor cannot “order” agency officials as to what they must do pursuant
to a particular statute? Was it also written in this manner to avoid
Judge McCown’s argument that governors cannot order an agency to adopt
a rule? It is significant that Governor Abbott is not attempting to be the
57. Id.
58. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
59. Executed, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
60. BEAL, supra note 54.
61. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n. v. Patient Advocs. of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 654
(Tex. 2004).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra Appendix 1.
65. Id.
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one who has the idea for a particular rule, which was true with
Governor Perry. However, governors clearly have such power, for the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that any “interested person”
may petition an agency to request the adoption of a rule.66 Without doubt,
the chief executive officer is such an interested person. Based on such a
petition, the agency has the power to initiate rulemaking proceedings.67
However, that would be done in the public sphere, which the governor
might not favor. Yet, it is probably a sound idea that the governor did not
include the power to suggest new rules in private. Why private?
It appears to be intentional, but it might be argued it is the only time that
makes sense for governor review to be held before notice and comment
rulemaking. Why? If governor review is done during the comment period,
it is incumbent upon the agency to summarize the governor’s comments,
identify the governor as a commentator, and set forth whether the governor
was for or against the rule, all of which would appear in the Texas
Register.68
This decision to review proposed rules prior to commencement of notice
and comment rulemaking is very troublesome due to the lack of
transparency. As indicated, this letter went out June 22, 2018, and there has
been no acknowledgement by the Governor’s office regarding the agencies’
compliance since they can refuse due to their set terms of office with a very
limited possibility of removal by two-thirds of the senate.69 If they are
complying, there has been no publication by the Governor’s office or any
agency as to what was discussed and what action, if any, was taken regarding
any proposed rule(s). Most importantly, what does a “dispassionate second
opinion” mean? Does the governor’s office say (1) “this rule cannot be
adopted,” or (2) “this rule can be adopted if you make these amendments,”
or (3) “you can adopt the rule ‘as is?’” In addition, when the governor’s
office says, “no rule” or “amended,” is it because the rule does not meet the
legislative standards for adoption or is it because the governor, for political
or economic reasons, does not want such a rule to be adopted? In other
words, is the “review” of proposed rules done so Governor Abbott can say
to companies thinking of moving to Texas: “I cannot get rid of regulatory

66. Interested Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 2001.021(a).
67. Id. § 2001.021(c)(2).
68. Id. § 2001.033(a)(1)(A).
69. TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 9(a).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/1

10

Beal: Texas: A Weak Governor State, or Is It?

2021]

TEXAS: A WEAK GOVERNOR STATE, OR IS IT?

273

agencies, but I can assure no rule will be adopted without my approval. I
have your backs?”
That brings us back to the concerns of the legislature. When the
legislature adopted the APA, they did not expressly provide for the
governor’s input on rules to be adopted except that the governor could
clearly comment, as set forth above, in public as an interested person.70
However, the APA expressly provides for legislative comment by requiring
all agencies to send their notices of proposed rules to them and allowing any
committee to comment by a vote of a majority of its members.71 This is
true whether the committee is for or against the rule to be adopted.72
Was the omission of the governor in the APA and a lack of procedure to
have agency send notices to the governor intentional? It is an accepted
canon of statutory construction that the court believes “every word
[excluded from] a statute must be presumed to have been [excluded] for a
purpose.”73 So, was the exclusion of the governor from the rulemaking
process intentional?
It could be argued, whether it was the intent of the legislature or not, that
a canon of construction cannot supersede the governor’s constitutional
executive power to faithfully execute the law, whether it be rulemaking or
law applying. Governor Abbott clearly decided, as the chief executive
officer, that he has the constitutional power to be intimately involved in
rulemaking of regulatory agencies. So, did the legislature not specifically
include the governor’s office in the APA because they knew he would set
up his own procedure to be involved?
The opposite argument could be made—that the legislature has the
constitutionally inherent power to delegate. The legislature has the ability to
delegate, but not the duty to do so.74 Thus, the legislature has discretion as
to when power is delegated, who will be included in the rulemaking process,
and who is expressly or implied excluded. Clearly, the governor has
absolutely no part in the details of formulating a statute except for the power

70. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.021(a) (providing the only way an interested person
may comment during the rulemaking process).
71. Id. § 2001.032(a).
72. Id. § 2001.032(c).
73. In re Bell, 91 S.W.3d 784, 790 (Tex. 2002).
74. City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 17–19 (Tex. 2009); Tex. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n v. Patient Advocs. of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tex. 2004).
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to threaten a veto.75 Further, it should be emphasized, the constitution
provides the governor “shall cause the laws to be faithfully executed.”76 If
“the laws” impliedly or expressly exclude the governor’s participation, under
separation of powers, this statutory decision was made by the legislature and
the governor must abide by it. Therefore, the governor can constitutionally
be involved, not solely based on their constitutional power, but in
conjunction with a legislative grant providing for their participation.
The second argument seems a more compelling and reasonable
interpretation of the constitution. However, it is unclear whether the
judiciary would find this exclusion by implication sufficient to overcome the
governor’s general power to faithfully execute the law. But the argument
may be more forceful after what the legislature did in the 2019 Texas
Legislative Session.77
B. Legislative Delegation of Rulemaking Power to the Governor
Just like Governor Abbott’s assertion of control over agency rulemaking,
the Texas Legislature, for the first time in Texas history, expressly delegated
to the governor the power to participate in the rulemaking process for select
agencies and select rules they may propose for adoption.78 The bill,
S.B. 1995, amended the Texas Occupations Code by adding Subchapter C
regarding the review of rules of agencies with a governing board that is
controlled by persons who provide services regulated by the agency.79
The governor is instructed to create a division within their office in order
to review state agency rules of the aforementioned boards.80 The only rules
that may be reviewed by the governor’s office are rules related to a license
issued by the agency and a rule affecting market competition in the state.
This includes any rulemaking proceeding affecting market competition.81
It also includes the repealing of an existing rule or the amending of an
existing rule that affects market competition.82 A rule affects market
competition if the rule would (1) create a barrier to market participation in
75. Compare TEX. CONST. art. III, § 29–38 (describing the various legislative processes involving
a bill), with TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14 interp. commentary (providing the gubernatorial veto process).
76. Id. § 10.
77. See discussion infra Section II.B.
78. Act of June 10, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 57, § 57.101–.107, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 668
(codified as TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 57.101–.107).
79. OCC. § 57.102.
80. Id. § 57.103(1).
81. Id. § 57.105(a).
82. Id. § 57.105(b).
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the state or (2) result in higher prices or reduced competition for a product
or service provided by or to a license holder in the state.83
Even though it is not expressly stated in the amendments, the governor’s
review will have to happen after the agency complies with notice and
comment rulemaking. The reason being, the amendments provide that an
agency may not adopt or implement a proposed rule unless the division has
approved it.84 By definition, the notice and comment process is designed
to have the agency learn from the public comment and, as a result, the
agency may often adopt a rule different from the one proposed.85
Therefore, if an agency files with the governor’s office and gets approval,
but then goes through notice and comment and modifies the rule, the
statutory provisions clearly require the final, amended rule to be submitted
for approval again before the rule can go into effect.
After the governor’s office review is complete, the division may either
(1) approve the proposed rule, or (2) reject it and return it to the agency with
instructions for revising the rule to be consistent with applicable state
policy.86 Therefore, the governor is given the express power to determine
which rules may be adopted and exactly how they will be written. Is this the
same power the governor is exercising under his own policy of rendering a
dispassionate second opinion?87 Not necessarily, for there are two key
differences. First, under the statutory plan, the governor and the governor’s
division can only reject or require modification if a rule contradicts statutory
criteria, not merely the political or economic views of the governor. Second,
the governor’s approach is to conduct the entire review and decision-making
process in private, whereas the new statutory provision requires it to done
publicly.88 The statute mandates the governor and their division provide
an explanation of the reasons for approving or rejecting a rule to the
public.89

83. Id. § 57.105(d)(1)–(2).
84. Id. § 57.105(a).
85. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocs. of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 649–50 (Tex.
2004); State Bd. of Ins. v. Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e).
86. OCC. § 57.105(d)(1)–(2) (Vernon Supp. 2019).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 41–52.
88. OCC. § 57.105(c).
89. Id.
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C. Did the Legislature Intentionally Set a Precedent for the Governor’s Involvement
in Rulemaking?
More than a month after Governor Abbott issued his letter to review all
rules of all agencies before they were adopted, a long-powerful, Republican
lawmaker stated this action was a “potentially unconstitutional power
grab.”90 Representative Byron Cook stated: “[N]othing in our state’s
constitution or statutes gives the Office of the Governor the power to veto
or delay the proposal of a rule . . . .”91 The legislature can change this to
enhance the governor’s clout—but only by passing a law or constitutional
amendment.
Since the legislature has now, in fact, adopted a law to provide the
governor power in rulemaking for a select number of agencies and a select
type of rule, was there more to this legislative act than appears on the face
of the bill?
Governor Abbott signed the bill into law. Did the act of signing it
constitute his acknowledgement that his involvement in rulemaking must be
predicated on a legislative act and the restrictions set forth therein? In other
words, did he admit he has no inherent power to participate in agency
rulemaking based on his general grant and duty to faithfully execute the law?
Thus, the constitutional power to participate only “kicks in” when the
legislature grants such power by statute. And, as to restrictions and
requirements in the statute, do they not limit the governor? Under
Governor Abbott’s rulemaking policy in his letter, all actions are done in
private with no information provided the public or legislature.92 Under the
statutory grant, any action taken by the governor’s rulemaking division must
be set forth in writing and provided to the public and the legislature.93
Thus, by signing SB 1995, Governor Abbott has expressly or impliedly
acknowledged he only has rulemaking power if the legislature grants it to
him by statute and, therefore, he must comply with the procedures and
restrictions set forth therein. So, did the legislature realize if it amended the
APA to prohibit the governor’s involvement generally in rulemaking, he
probably would have vetoed that bill? Whereas, by taking the approach of
delegating him some limited rulemaking power, has it set the precedent of
90. Emma Platoff, Retiring GOP State Rep Blasts Abbott’s Move to Expand Power over Agencies, TEX.
TRIB. (Aug. 14, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/14/byron-cook-texasgovernor-abbott-agency-rule-making-power-grab/ [https://perma.cc/NAY6-7F65].
91. Id.
92. See infra Appendix 1.
93. OCC. § 57.105(f).
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being the sole body that can allow the governor to participate in the agency
rulemaking process?
Finally, the APA does not expressly provide for governor involvement in
rulemaking—and impliedly prohibits it—and the legislature has now
established it decides when the governor can be involved. Because of the
lack of constitutional authority to do so, does this set up a potentially viable
legal challenge to the governor’s policy of reviewing every rule in secret? A
possible alternative could be that the legislature should pass a bill requiring
the governor’s review of rules to be done in public by providing written
reasons for adopting or not a particular rule. Could the governor, politically,
veto such a bill?
Representative Byron Cook concluded his statements by stating:
“Something like this has extraordinary consequences . . . .”94
Governor Abbott’s assertion of control over all agency rulemaking
significantly enhances the power of the Texas governor. The label of the
governor’s office being constitutionally “weak” when the governor has total
control over all rulemaking by all agencies clearly falls by the wayside and
allows the governor to exercise.
III. LAW APPLYING: THE GOVERNOR’S POWER TO DIRECTLY CONTROL
STATE OFFICERS: HOLDOVER OFFICERS
A. To Be a Successor Who Is Qualified
In the Texas Constitution, the requirements for one to be a “successor”
to another state officer lawfully holding an office are clear and unambiguous.
If one is an elected official, they obviously need to win an election. If one
is appointed, the governor has the power of appointment, but the senate
must approve the selection by a two-thirds vote.95 A successor is legally
defined as “[s]omeone who succeeds to the office, rights, responsibilities, or
place of another”; and, accordingly, “succession” is the “right of legally or

94. Robert T. Garrett, Lawmaker Accuses Greg Abbott of Unconstitutional Power Grab, Citing
Governor’s Push to Review Texas Regulations, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 14, 2018, 11:12 AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2018/08/14/lawmaker-accuses-greg-abbott-of-unconst
itutional-power-grab-citing-governor-s-push-to-review-texas-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/GHE7JAA3].
95. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 12(a)–(b), interp. commentary; see supra text accompanying notes
9–11.
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officially taking over a predecessor’s office, rank, or duties.”96 Thus,
winning an election or being appointed with senate approval makes one a
successor to another state officer and vests in them the right to exercise the
powers of that office.
However, it does not end there. The successor must also be qualified,
meaning: “Possessing the necessary qualifications; capable or competent.”97
If one is elected, the secretary of state conducts several seminars throughout
the year before an election to educate persons on any qualifications.98
Generally, the individual must obtain a certificate of elections, a statement
of the elected official, must take an oath of office, and must secure an
adequate bond.99 As to appointed officers, after approval by the senate,
they must take an oath of office100 and establish proof of residency within
the state.101 In addition, based on the particular office’s statutory
requirements, an officer may have to establish proof of holding a particular
license, years of practice in a particular profession or specialty, and possibly
secure a bond.102
Therefore, within the context of securing a state office, there are two
separate conditions precedent before one has the legal right to exercise the
powers of that office: they must be (1) duly elected or appointed with senate
approval and (2) qualified.103 Proof of qualification is a condition
subsequent to succession, whether by winning the election or securing office
by appointment and senate approval.
The framers of the constitution anticipated that, in some instances,
securing requisite proof of qualification (even though they are clearly the
successor) may take time that extends beyond the beginning of one’s
term.104 If that is so, the person may not hold or exercise the powers of
the office until the qualifications are met. Thus, the framers provided: “All
96. Successor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Succession, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
97. Qualified, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98. Seminar Dates, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/seminars
/dates.shtml [https://perma.cc/3L76-QSVU].
99. Qualifications for All Public Offices, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.state.tx.
us/elections/candidates/guide/2020/qualifications2020.shtml [https://perma.cc/6BH6-9LL3].
100. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
101. Id. § 14.
102. See Qualifications for All Public Offices, supra note 98 (providing additional qualifications for
constable, for instance).
103. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1, 17.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 102–03.
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officers of this State shall continue to perform the duties of their office until
their successors shall be duly qualified.”105 Thus, even though the current
officeholder does not have a new term, they may “hold over” until their
successor is qualified.106
The clear and unambiguous language demonstrates this provision only
applies to a current officeholder if, at the time their term expires, a successor
is in existence whether by election or appointment and senate
ratification.107 The language clearly states the current officeholder’s
extended term is until that successor, who is in existence, takes the steps to
become qualified for the office. The reason being, becoming “qualified” is
wholly irrelevant until such time the person is the designated successor. As
set forth above, the person only takes the steps to secure the proof of
qualification with certain constitutional and statutory requirements after
they have become a successor.108
Therefore, if the current office holder’s term expires, and there is no
“successor” in place, this constitutional provision simply does not apply.
The language does not say one can continue in office as the current
officeholder until there is a successor and that successor becomes qualified.
No. The entire focus is extending their term until “their” successor is
qualified.109 The term “their” is used to indicate possession.110 Clearly,
this indicates a person in existence who has the right to hold the office. If
there is no successor at the time, the current officeholders term expires
because they simply do not have a specific successor.111
We need not rely on this language above. Article IV, regarding the
executive branch, provides expressly that “the expiration of a term of
office . . . constitutes a vacancy.”112 The legal meaning of a vacancy is:
“The quality, state, or condition of being unoccupied, esp[ecially] in
reference to an office, poste, or piece of property.”113 Therefore, reading
the two provisions as a whole, if there is no existing successor at the time a
105. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a). Subsection (b) limits the time for appointed officers who
do not receive a salary. Id. § 17(b). Even if their successor is not qualified by the end of the next
legislative session, their term expires and the office becomes vacant. Id.
106. Id. § 17(a).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 100–03.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 96–105.
109. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a).
110. WEBSTER’S II: NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1143 (2001).
111. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(b).
112. Id. art. IV, § 12(i).
113. Vacancy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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current officeholder’s term expires their term ends and they have no right
to remain in office or exercise the powers of that office.114 However, if a
successor is in existence, by election or appointment and senate approval,
the current officeholder’s term continues until their successor becomes
qualified.115
It is a fundamental canon of constitutional construction that one
provision of the constitution should not be construed to render other
portions of the constitution as superfluous,116 nor render them to be
meaningless or inoperative.117 So, if the holdover provision also applied
when no successor existed at the expiration of the current officer’s term,
and the current officer continued in office until a successor became
qualified, that would render the second constitutional provision superfluous
and void.118 Simply put, no office would ever become “vacant” when an
officer’s term expired—every officer would be entitled to remain in office
for an unknown number of years until a successor came into existence and
was duly qualified.119
B. Governor Abbott’s Apparent Interpretation of the Constitutional Holdover
Provision
Even though Governor Abbott has not publicly, orally, or in writing
stated his legal interpretation of the holdover provision, the governor’s
actions speak louder than words. On June 2, 2016, his office provided staff
documentation and oral acknowledgement that the governor, at that time,
had 336 holdover appointees who were designated as such because their
terms had expired, but they were allowed to remain in office until he
appointed someone new or decided to reappoint the current holdover

114. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12.
115. Id.
116. See Duncan v. Gabler, 215 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. 1948) (“An important established rule
for construing the [c]onstitution is that all of its provisions affecting the same thing must be construed
together and so construed if possible as to give effect to all of them.”) (citing Jones v. Williams,
45 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1931)).
117. Carrington v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 49 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Tex. 2001) (citing Stringer v.
Cendant Mortg. Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000)); Hanson v. Jordan, 198 S.W.2d 262, 263
(Tex. 1946).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12.
119. Id.
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officer.120 Some had served as holdover officers up to five years after their
terms expired.121 The Texas Tribune concluded they could stay in office as
long as they were eligible; that is, alive and Texan.122 On June 6, 2019, the
governor’s office produced documentation indicating there were 418
holdover officers whose terms expired up to eight years prior.123 Once
again, they were considered holdover officers because no successor had
been appointed when their term expired.124
Clearly the governor, his staff, or both, believe the constitutional
holdover provision includes or covers current officeholders whose terms
have expired and there is no existing appointed new officer.125 Therefore,
those officers remain in office and exercise the powers of that office
(sometimes up to eight additional years) simply because the governor has
failed, intentionally or not, to reappoint them or appoint someone new.126
There are significant problems with this existing scenario. Since staff
members’ original appointments have expired, their continuation in office
does not necessitate senate approval and they have no set term, allowing
them to serve up to eight years or more with no constitutional limit to their
terms of office.127 Further, they serve at the pleasure of the governor since
they are not appointed—which is much easier than convincing two-thirds
of the senate to agree. Additionally, the governor is allowed to direct their
activities through the implied threat of terminating their position. Even the
chief judge of the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) has been
privy to this scenario.128 The SOAH was created to be an independent
forum for the conduct of adjudicative hearings in the executive branch that
would separate the adjudicative functions from the policy making
functions.129 Despite the obvious conflict of interest created by allowing

120. Ross Ramsey, More Than 300 Gubernational Appointees Have Expired Terms, TEX. TRIB.
(June 6, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/02/texas-gov-abbotts-300-plusholdover-appointees/ [https://perma.cc/97HE-ETC4].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Michael King, Law Professor Ron Beal Surrenders to Governor Abbott’s “Code of Silence”, AUSTIN
CHRON. (June 6, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/2019-06-06/lawprofessor-ron-beal-surrenders-to-governor-abbotts-code-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/S2S8-2P3L].
124. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 119–23.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.021(a).
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governors to control the actions of an officer serving in a judicial capacity,
governors retain total control over officer actions.
Could this have been the intent of the original framers? Despite setting
up a weak governor system, the framers, in essence, sought to allow—
though the holdover provision—a fiefdom, per se, of state officers to serve
at the governor’s pleasure as they implement the legislative policy of the
state in agency rulemaking or adjudication?
It would appear the legal, judicial response would be—and should be—
that these officers have no power, maintaining them in office is
unconstitutional, and all agencies headed by one or more holdover officers
lack the power to enforce their statutory schemes. The reason being, as
discussed above, the judiciary will not interpret one section of the Texas
Constitution in a way rendering other sections meaningless or
inoperative.130 Governor Abbott’s apparent legal interpretation of the
constitutional holdover provision nullifies:
(1) That when an officer’s term expires and there is no successor in
existence, the office becomes vacant;131
(2) Constitutional term limits have no application since the officer has
not been appointed and approved by the senate;132
(3) The senate may only review appointed and reappointed officers, so
they have no voice in officers serving terms far beyond the
constitutional maximum;133
(4) Removal of an officer by the senate is inapplicable because there are
no set terms giving them for-cause protection, thereby vesting sole
power in the governor;134 and
(5) The governor’s sole power to remove eliminates any concept of
“independent agencies” due to the lack of set terms.135
Governor Abbott’s alleged interpretation and his actual acts literally gut
the constitution that was designed to restrict the power of the governor over
appointed officers. He is currently in total control of their tenure and the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Carrington v. Ameriquest, 49 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. 2001).
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 12(i).
Id. art. XVI, § 30a.
Id. art. IV, § 12(c).
Id. art. XV, § 9(a).
Id. art. XVI, § 30(a).
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exercise of the power of their office. Now that is a powerful governor. How
many holdover officers will there be next year?
IV. CONCLUSION: AT THE PRESENT TIME, GOVERNOR ABBOTT
IS A VERY POWERFUL GOVERNOR
It has been established that Governor Abbott has taken steps in his
official capacity to wholly control all rulemaking by regulatory agencies in
Texas and—at his discretion—maintain select state officers who will do his
bidding for a tenure potentially lasting until the people of Texas decide he
should no longer guide the State of Texas as governor. Pursuant to this
actual reality, the State of Texas cannot be labeled a weak governor state.
Governor Abbott has chosen to exercise the powers due to a total lack
of judicial interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions and a
seemingly unwillingness on the part of the legislature and other state officials
to confront him as to his exercise of rulemaking power and holdover
officers. The framers must be wondering where all of the independent,
elected executive branch officers—the attorney general, lieutenant
governor, and comptroller—are throughout this exercise of significant
executive power based on very questionable legal basis. Only time will tell.
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